[What follows is not clear. It's too technical-sounding, and I garble Colebrook's lucid argument. Maybe it will come out clear when transmitted on the Internet. Like that moment in The Crying of Lot 49 where a man interviewing the heroine Oedipa Maas says "Thank you, Mrs. Edna Mosh," and then assures Oedipa "it'll come out OK on the air."]
In the the April 2006 issue of Actual-Virtual Claire Colebrook lectures on the secret. How far Deleuze criticism has come, that someone should speak so lucidly about the positivity of the literary in Deleuze and Guattari, instead of rhapsodizing about rhizomes. Colebrook talks about the positivity of secrecy in two chapters or plateaus of the 1000 Plateaus: "Three Novellas" and the "Becoming-Animal." She contrasts a mode of reading that asserts "we are already in an order of signification, such that we always necessarily ask, what is the secret?" or such that we always fantasize that the Other has (or is) the secret. --She contrasts that mode of reading, which she assigns to Butler, Zizek, and Felman, with a Deleuzian mode. In the "Three Novellas" chapter, D&G say that in the novella "something has happened," whereas in the tale we want to know "what is going to happen." Just so, the literary text in general is one that says that there is secrecy. Not: what is the secret, but just, "there is secrecy." She traces this out in a discussion of Henry James's What Masie Knew in the "1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Anmial" chapter of 1,000 Plateaus.--more below.
In another lecture in that same issue of Actual-Virtual, Ray Brassier wrestles down the "perversion of Kant & subversion of Bergson" that is Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, to ask, in the end:
For what has Deleuze's unyoking of difference from the fourfold shackles of representation achieved, if these diverging channels of actualization and ontological differentiation remain tethered to what Kant would have called a merely rhapsodic catalogue of factultative distinctions on the one hand, and, an equally rhapsodic enumeration of the different senses of being on the other?. ... If Being is going to be differentiated, then the point is to show that these differences are necessary, they're not merely arbitrarily generated on the basis of empirical distinctions. ... If Being is said in a single and same sense of everything that is, and that of which it is said differs, what is the status of these modal differences in everything that is?
Oh, I started citing too soon. He goes on to say that Deleuze uses Bergson to synthesize Spinoza and Kant, and that Bergson's method of intuition ends up being sort of flimsy to occupy this keystone space. ... I sort of fall behind the level of Brassier's discussion here.
(I return to a hobbyhorse of mine, rather than discuss Brassier) -- In Deleuze's perversion of Kant, Deleuze puts Kantian critique out of work. Reason in Kant's first critique has something like a schematism ("the idea of reason is an analogon of the schema of sensibility" A 664, B 692); reason's proper job (in the speculative interest) is demanding unity of principles in the understanding's objects. In the perverted Kant of Difference and Repetition there is still something like a schematism (a sub-representational, sub-understanding emergence of differences: "the agents of differenciation are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within or beneath [the understanding], like a hidden art" (D&R, p 218). Now that Ideas don't have to bother with keeping house for the understanding, they are free to incite everything, every faculty, not just thought, to its transcendent exercise.
Is there a place where Colebrook's investigation and
"For if the dynamism is external to concepts-- and, as such, a schema--it is internal to Ideas --and, as such, a drama or dream.
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Dramatisation takes place under the critical eye of the savant as much as it does in the head of the dreamer. It acts below the sphere of concepts and the representations subsumed by them." (D&R p 218).
Just as the novella says "that there is secrecy," Deleuze's Difference and Repetition says "there is a hidden art," and is singularly untroubled by that hidden-ness. It does not compel Deleuze to critique, to the winnowing down of reason's fancies. It's an unemployment of reason's proper employment; a new sense to the phrase, in D&G's Kafka book, "Criticism is completely useless."
I remain at the pre-critical level of rhapsodizing about Deleuze's wildness.